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Introduction
Two stylized factors in water markets:
• Around ninety percent of all surface water reservoirs are managed by local
or federal governments, and running a balanced budget has been a top
priority.
• In many parts of the world (including sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East,
and Southern Europe), countries suffer from water supply volatility
accompanied by temporary but frequent water shortages.
• OECD: “Several OECD countries have experienced periodic water
shortages, based on high levels of leakage in the water supply systems, or
inefficient usage encountered by insufficient pricing policies.”
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Introduction
1. Agricultural sector:
* About 70% of all withdrawals in the world are by agriculture.
* Government subsidization towards agricultural sector.
* Non-volumetric irrigation pricing schemes.
2. Water price paid by agriculture is around 1% of tap price paid by
households and industry; see figure 1:
* The United States: $0.05 per m3 vs. $1.25 per m3
* France: $0.08 per m3 vs. $3.11 per m3
* Italy, Japan, Turkey: Non-volumetric irrigation pricing schemes.
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Figure: Water Prices for Different Sectors in OECD Countries
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Research Questions
1. To what extent an optimal pricing rule can avoid these water shortages?
* Structural estimation of the model using monthly data from Turkey on
water flows, crop compositions, water and crop prices, from 1984 to 2007.
* Implications of current and optimal water pricing rules on water
management and water users
2. Alternative measures under the ACP rule:
* Supply-side measures: Increasing reservoir capacity, preventing leakages
* Demand-side measures: Lower crop-water requirements
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Key Features
1. Partial equilibrium model with revenue and resource constraints, and
multiple sectors
2. Changes in crop composition in response to water scarcity along with
other factors (crop prices, land productivity).
3. The water supplier may charge higher prices. Nonetheless, all profits are
rebated back to the consumers and producers.
4. Empirical Analysis: Structural estimation of crop composition and tap
water demand, and quantitative comparisons of the two pricing policies
5. Program Evaluation: Monte Carlo Simulations to evaluate the frequency
of water shortages.
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Model
• Partial equilibrium model for water
• Demand for water: Monthly demand by households and seasonal demand
by agriculture.
• Supply for water: A benevolent government controls two water prices.
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Households
• Consumers spend their income on tap water and a composite good.
• Tap water may have different uses, such as drinking (price-non-responsive)
and non-drinking (price-responsive) components.
• Utility maximization problem leads to the total demand for tap water.
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Agriculture
• Producers are identical farmers in a perfectly competitive output market.
• Leontief production function in agriculture depends on land and water.
• Mixed-Choice Problem:
* Farmers choose which crop to produce.
* Having chosen the crop, the farmers then decide how much land to allocate.
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Estimation: Irrigation Water
• Model: Representative farmer’s solution at the equilibrium is true for all
farmers.
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Estimation: Irrigation Water
• Model: Representative farmer’s solution at the equilibrium is true for all
farmers.
• Data: Heterogeneity in crop choices across farmers and time
• General Equilibrium: Farmers would be indifferent across crops.
• Partial Equilibrium with iid shocks across farmers and time
Details
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Agents
• The government
* observes the total stock at the beginning of each period,
* chooses the two water prices optimally,
* rebates all the profits back as a lump-sum transfer.
• Dynamic Ramsey Pricing Problem is:
* to maximize discounted expected lifetime utility of agents:
* subject to dynamic resource constraint
* subject to sectoral revenue constraints.
• In case of a water shortage, the government uses rationing for both sectors.
Details
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Data
• Data collection:
* Water flows data from the State Water Works
* Irrigation price and land allocation data from the local water user
associations
* Tap price, quantity, and water sanitation data from the municipality
* Climatic variables from Turkish Meteorological Institute
• Monthly time-series data from 01/1984 to 08/2007
• Irrigation prices and land allocation are yearly data from 1984 to 2007.


























































































































































































































Figure: Geographical (GIS) Map of Cukurova





























































Figure: Reservoir Flows (January–December)
Introduction Model Data Estimation Results Conclusion
Figure: Tap Price vs Revenue: Inelastic demand for tap water.
































Figure: Tap Water Use and Price











































Figure: Irrigation Water Prices
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Figure: Crop Composition
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Estimation: Tap Water
Functional Form for the Tap Water Demand
• is consistent with utility maximization problem
• delivers inelastic demand for tap water.
Stone-Geary functional form for the utility.
U = π1 log (w1 − w1) + (1− π1) log y
Demand for tap water is:
w1 = (1− π1)w1 + π1
I
p1
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Estimation: Tap Water
Demand for tap water is:




• w1: subsistence level
• π1: marginal budget of tap water
Methods: Least Absolute Deviation (LAD) vs.Least-Squares (LS) Methods
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Estimation: Tap Water
Stone-Geary Double Log
Variable LS LAD LS LAD
Constant 1.6969 1.8418 1.6875 1.8007 -0.1750 -0.0791 -0.1444 -0.2464
(0.1160) (0.1223) (0.0708) (0.0945) (0.2959) (0.3178) (0.236) (0.3043)
I/p1 0.0005 0.0005 0.0006 0.0005 - - - -
(0.0002) 0.0002 (0.0001) (0.0002)
log p1 - - - - 0.2517 0.1682 0.2512 0.2322
(0.1022) (0.10365) (0.0859) (0.0924)
log I - - - - 0.7941 0.6335 0.7827 0.8101
(0.1853) (0.2058) (0.1833) (0.1993)
θ1 - -0.0019 - -0.0009 - -0.0007 - -0.0003
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0003)
logLw1 - - - - - - - -
Obs. 108 97 108 97 108 97 108 97
Double Log PA
Variable LS LAD
Constant -0.1345 0.0898 -0.023 0.3057
(0.2626) (0.2796) (0.2120)) (0.2600)
I/p1 - - - -
log p1 0.1233 0.0424 0.0786 0.0522
(0.0933) (0.0935) (0.0739) (0.0828)
log I 0.4173 0.1947 0.2684 0.0793
(0.1775) (0.1967) (0.1535) (0.1823)
θ1 - -0.0007 - -0.0008
(0.0002) (0.0003)
logLw1 0.4879 0.5106 0.5821 0.6447
(0.0875) (0.0932) (0.0929) (0.0919)
Obs. 107 96 107 96
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Estimation: Irrigation Water
• Leontief production function:






;∀c = 1, . . . , N
• The representative farmer solves a mixed-choice problem:
Π = max (Π1, . . . ,ΠN ,ΠN+1) where
Πc = max
<ℓc>
(pfc f(ℓc, w2c)− p2 w2c + µc ℓc) ;∀c = 1, . . . , N
∋ ℓc ≤ ℓ¯ = 1,
ΠN+1 = 0
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Estimation: Irrigation Water






c=1: crop water requirements
* {µc}
N
c=1: mean values of shocks
• Method: due to little variation in crop and irrigation prices,
* I calibrate α, and γ—technological parameters,
* I estimate µ using the generalized method of moments.
Cotton Maize Wheat Sugar beets
Coefficient 1.4963 -2.7698 0.7233 -5.049
Standard Error 0.1761 0.4333 0.1818 0.4333
Gradient (× 1e− 4) 0.0001 0 -0.0001 0
Objective (× 1e− 6) 0
Number of Observations 24
Table: Estimation of Land Allocations
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Figure: Irrigation Water Demand






















































Figure: Irrigation Water Demand
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Figure: Water Shortages






































Figure: Water Shortages in the Turkish Data
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Model Fit and Counterfactuals
Definition: A water shortage when the irrigation water use is less than 0.65
times its standard deviation below the sample mean.
• Questions:
* Starting from 01/1984, can the model predict the years with water
shortage?
* Can these water shortages in the last 24 years be avoided using optimal
pricing rule?
• Method:
* Assign the state variables their values in 01/1984
* Simulate the economy from 1984 and 2007 using the data on inflows and
crop prices
Source Pricing Rule Years of Water Shortage
Data Average-Cost Prices 1989, 1991, 1994, 1999, 2001, 2004, 2005, 2006
Model Average-Cost Prices 1989, 1991, 1994, 1999, 2001, 2004, 2006
Model Optimal Prices
Table: Water Shortages in the Turkish Data
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Forecasts and Counterfactuals
Implications of the Pricing Policies on Water Resource Management
• Under the current pricing policy (break-even prices), the government
experiences water shortage every 8 years, with a standard deviation of 8
years.
• Under the current pricing policy (break-even prices), the government
experiences a severe water shortage (below subsistence) every 50 years.
• If the government chooses the water prices optimally, water shortages
never occur.
Source Pricing Rule Type Mean Year Std Year Mean No
Model Optimal Water Shortages 100.000 0 0
Model Average-Cost Water Shortages 8.237 8.120 10.687
Model Average-Cost Below Subsistence 50.998 35.516 1.530
Table: Comparison of Average-Cost and Optimal Pricing Rules
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Counterfactuals
Keeping the current pricing policy, what are some alternative methods to target
so many years without water shortages?
• Efficiency of water usage in production
* A one percent increase in irrigation efficiency delays water shortages for 12
years, on average.
* A five percent increase in irrigation efficiency delays water shortages for 68
years, on average.
* How can this be implemented? Switching irrigation methods: from surface
to drip/sprinkler irrigation technologies.
Improvements in Irrigation






Table: Percent Improvement in Irrigation
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Counterfactuals
Keeping the current pricing policy, what are some alternative methods to target
so many years without water shortages?
• Supply-side improvements
* A one hm3 increase in monthly inflows delays water shortages for 17 years,
on average.
* A five hm3 increase in monthly efficiency delays water shortages for a
century, on average.
* How can this be implemented? Preventing leakages.
Increase in Monthly Inflows






Table: Improvement in Mean Annual Inflows
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Conclusion
• Model fit:
* Under the current policy, I replicated the years of water shortages observed
in the data, except for 2005.
* The government could have avoided these water shortages observed in the
data under the optimal pricing rule.
• Any extensions? Sag˘lam (2012).
* Profits from supplying water can be saved for the next period.
* External water resource which can supply water, if desired, at a certain cost
to avoid water shortages.
Desalination technology, network of reservoirs
* Effects of cross-subsidization (often in favor of agriculture)
* Welfare comparisons of different pricing policies and counterfactual
exercises.
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Figure: Effect of Reservoir Capacity







































Figure: Policy Function for the Irrigation Price
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Dynamic Ramsey Pricing
The monthly value functions m = 0, 1, . . . , 11 can be defined in the following
way:
V (w,p−1; θ,m) = max
<w′,W3,p>















E [Ri(p, τ ; θ)] = E [Ci(p,τ ; θ)] + τi/ (1− λ) ; ∀ i = 1, 2; if m = 0,
pi = pi,−1; ∀ i = 1, 2; otherwise,
W1(p, τ ; θ,m),W2(p; θ),W3,p, τ ≥ 0
Back
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Estimation: Irrigation Water
• Partial Equilibrium: shock to the profit function
• Observed profit function:
Π = max (Π1, . . . ,ΠN ,ΠN+1) where
Πc = max
<ℓc>
(pfc f(ℓc, w2c)− p2 w2c + µc ℓc) ;∀c = 1, . . . , N
∋ ℓc ≤ ℓ¯ = 1,
ΠN+1 = 0
• Although farmers make discrete choices, the government only has a
probability distribution over crops.
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